Turkey's diplomatic U-turn. Will Ankara achieve its strategic goals?
THE STORY BY Memet Aksakal
Cover photo: Balkis Press/Abaca
Turkish authorities have been making intensive efforts over the past year to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Egypt. Turkey's isolation in the region, the economic crisis, and the decline in support for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are the main factors that have contributed to Ankara's foreign policy reorientation. But will the "new opening" policy allow Erdogan to improve Turkey's standing and ensure his re-election?
Turkey's dreams of power
When Recep Tayyip Erdogan took office as prime minister after winning the 2002 parliamentary elections, he embarked on closer political and economic relations with Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. At the level of declarations, the policy has been cemented by anti-Israel and anti-Western statements and an insistence that all Muslims are brothers and are one. That's why many of Erdogan's supporters today see him as the leader of the Ummah and consider him the most influential politician in the Islamic world.
With the advent of the Arab Spring Erdogan began to support Islamists seeking power, seeing this as an opportunity to unite the Ummah. As a result, preserving good relations with secular governments in the Middle East and North Africa ceased to be a priority for the Turkish president. Erdogan's policies have led to a weakening of relations with partners in the region and a diminished Ankara's standing.
"Turkey has been left alone, undermining all its relations," says Namik Tan, Turkey's former ambassador to the US and Israel. As he points out, during the Arab Spring, Ankara's main foreign policy goal was to create a 'Sunni backyard' consisting primarily of Syria and North African countries. However, the implementation of this plan was hindered by several factors, including the economic crisis that affected the entire region.
"In addition, fronts have begun to form against Turkey. Strained relations, stemming mainly from the Eastern Mediterranean problem, have brought countries such as Egypt, Israel, and even Italy closer to Greece. Also, there has been a failure to develop a common agenda in relations with the European Union and the United States," Tan assesses. "When a step is taken without making some strategic calculations, the results will be detrimental," he stresses.
Photo: A military ceremony is held in the Afrin countryside in northern Syria for the graduation of 2,500 fighters from the Syrian National Army (SNA). The SNA is a coalition of armed Syrian groups opposed to the government of President Bashar Al-Assad and allied with Turkey. Photo: Juma Mohammad/Zuma Press/Forum
That's why many of Erdogan's supporters today see him as the leader of the Ummah and consider him the most influential politician in the Islamic world.
Photo: Juma Mohammad/Zuma Press/Forum
A decade of troubles
After the fall of Hosni Mobarak's government in 2011 and the election of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt's president, Erdogan decided to support authorities affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, Morsi made his first foreign visit to Turkey. When the army ousted the Egyptian president in July 2013, Erdogan called on the international community not to recognize the new government, which he accused of practicing "state terrorism." It resulted in the rank of diplomatic relations being downgraded to the level of charge d'affaires.
In 2017, during a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, Erdogan backed Qatar. Another escalation followed a year later when journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated at Saudi Arabia's consulate in Istanbul. Erdogan has repeatedly blamed Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman for the murder. Relations with the Emirates, in turn, deteriorated when Ankara accused the UAE of being financially involved in the failed 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.
Turkey's relations with Israel have also deteriorated. In May 2021, Erdogan described Israel as a "terror state" that "mercilessly and unethically attacks Muslims in Jerusalem." It's worth noting, however, that the crisis had already occurred in 2018 when both countries closed their embassies and downgraded diplomatic relations to the level of charge d'affaires. On the other hand, Turkey's partnership with the West plunged by the S-400 missile system purchase from Russia. As a result, Ankara was excluded from the F-35 joint strike fighter program in 2019.
Another dispute involved a maritime border agreement between Turkey and Libya in November 2019, as opposed by Egypt and Greece. In addition, the US and the EU backed the government in Athens in the Turkish-Greek conflict over gas extraction in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, relations between Ankara and Moscow have also deteriorated. It's all due to the Bayraktar drones that Turkey sold to Ukraine and tensions arising from the situation in Idlib, Syria, which is under Ankara's control.
Photo: Aziz Karmiov/Reuters/ForumPhoto: Pro-Islamist demonstrators shout slogans in favour of former Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi and hold signs that show the Rabaa hand gesture, which symbolizes support for the Muslim Brotherhood, during a rally in front of the Haghia Sophia museum at Sultanahmet square in Istanbul, Turkey, May 24, 2015. Photo: Yagiz Karahan/Reuters/Forum
In May 2021, Erdogan described Israel as a "terror state" that "mercilessly and unethically attacks Muslims in Jerusalem."
Photo: Murad Sezer/Reuters/Forum
A strategic turn in foreign policy
Over time, it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood had no chance of regaining power in Egypt and that Bashir al-Assad's regime in Syria would survive. The April 2019 overthrow of Omar Bashir, who ruled Sudan for 30 years, also served as a wake-up call for policymakers in Ankara. And inflamed relations with the West have severely hampered the possibility of financial support during the crisis and effectively put the brakes on earlier plans to join the European Union.
Aside from the adverse trends in Turkish politics, the economic crisis became another challenge. Erdogan began to lose support, jeopardizing his chances of winning the 2023 elections. To get out of his predicament, he decided to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for economic support, as well as with Egypt and Israel, as these countries moved closer to Greece. Furthermore, Egypt strengthened its standing in Libya, threatening Ankara's strategic interests.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid attend a joint press conference in Ankara, Turkey, on June 23, 2022. Turkey and Israel have started work to appoint ambassadors as part of efforts to normalize ties. Photo: Mustafa Kaya/Xinhua News Agency/ForumAs the situation worsened, Erdogan decided to take a strategic turn in foreign policy. The pace of change is noteworthy. For example, in November 2021, the Turkish president announced that he wanted to improve diplomatic ties with Israel, although six months earlier, he had described it as a "terror state." The first step toward change, however, was a thaw in relations with the United Arab Emirates.
In November 2021, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan made his first visit to Ankara in nearly a decade. During his meeting with Erdogan, he promised to invest $10 billion in Turkey and signed agreements on energy, environment, finance, and trade. In February 2022, Erdogan visited the United Arab Emirates for the first time since 2013.
Erdogan in the quest for stability and support
In December 2021, Erdogan hosted members of the Turkish Jewish community and representatives of the Alliance of Rabbis in the Islamic States (ARIS), led by Ishak Haleva, the Chief Rabbi of Turkey. He then stressed the importance of the Turkey-Israel relationship and asked the rabbis for their assistance in improving relations. Israel's President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey on March 9, 2022. Following the meeting, Erdogan announced that the visit would be "a turning point" for both countries.
As part of efforts to improve ties with Riyadh, the trial of Jamal Khashoggi murder suspects was suspended on April 7, 2022, and moved to Saudi Arabia. Just three weeks later, the Turkish president paid an official visit to the country. During his speech, he stressed that it is in the mutual interest of Ankara and Riyadh to strengthen political, military, and cultural cooperation. Of crucial importance will be the development of cooperation in trade and investment in the context of the crisis that has plunged the Turkish lira.
However, there was no breakthrough in Turkish-Egyptian relations, as Erdogan failed to meet all the conditions set by the government in Cairo. Turkish authorities ordered Muslim Brotherhood TV channels in Istanbul to stop broadcasting programs critical of Egypt, but this was not enough. Cairo is demanding the extradition of all Muslim Brotherhood members, the withdrawal of Turkish troops and Syrian mercenaries from Libya, and the cancellation of the maritime agreement with that country.
For Turkey, a pragmatic solution would also be to improve relations with the West, but this would be challenging in the current situation. The main obstacle is Erdogan's authoritarian style of governance. In addition, the Turkish president would like to become the leader of the Islamic states, so he is more interested in rapprochement with China and Russia than with the West. Increasing Ankara's role on the international stage is one of the goals set for 2023, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey.
Photo: Israeli President Isaac Herzog attends a meeting with representatives of the Jewish community in Istanbul, Turkey, on March 10, 2022. Following a "historic" meeting with the Turkish president in the capital Ankara, Israeli President Isaac Herzog met with representatives of the Jewish community in Turkey's financial and cultural hub in Istanbul. Photo: Sha Dati/Xinhua News Agency/Forum
Will Ankara achieve its strategic goals?
Will Erdogan's rush to rebuild diplomatic relations save Turkey from an economic crisis and ensure Erdogan's re-election in 2023? It is questionable, as this is only the beginning of the process. Moreover, Erdogan's efforts are meeting some resistance, if only from Egypt. And Turkey's plans for a leading role in the Islamic world may fall apart due to the reluctance of Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Islam's two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Nevertheless, a change is taking place in Turkish foreign policy. Recep Tayyip Erdogan will continue the "new opening" policy due to the economic crisis and the need for financial support. Turkey also needs allies in the region for geopolitical reasons. Ankara has become heavily involved in armed conflicts in Syria and Libya as it seeks to improve its position in the Mediterranean. For this reason, Erdogan needs at least tacit approval for Turkey's goals in both countries.
Namik Tan believes Turkey had no choice but to improve diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern countries. As he notes, Ankara has realized that the only way out of loneliness is to "rethink with great pragmatism its relations with key actors." The question, however, is whether a declarative willingness to cooperate politically and economically will be enough to overcome the strategic differences that divide the region's countries. Each, after all, has its own strategic goals, not necessarily in line with Turkish objectives.
Photo: Supporters of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan hold flags and a banner as they gather in front of his hotel in Brussels, Belgium June 13, 2021. Photo: Johanna Geron/Reuters/Forum
